Kant paradox: in order to be transcendental idealists we must have things in themselves, but this is unacceptable.

Unintelligibility: why should an idealist accept Hegel's move from modern skepticism to ancient skepticism?

We have non-inferential self-knowledge, self-awareness-modern skepticism. I can doubt the world, but I can't doubt my representations. We can doubt the world, but not thought. So there is no dependency of my inner on the way the world is. The relationship between my inner and the way the world is is external, contingent. This raises the problem of representation. How am I going to get from what's inside to what's outside?

Leibniz's: world is populated by just different perspective on it. Each consciousness is just a take on how the world is. God brings in a preestablished harmony. Kant said this is logically compatible with my being the only monad. This is a consequence of modern skepticism.

Cf. Critique of Pure Reason "The Refutation of Idealism:" My awareness of myself is actually dependent on, is mediated by the world. If the world varies, if I vary the world, I must vary my inner.

Kant: the inner is logically dependent on the outer, so vary one, vary the other. Hegel is just going to replace the external with another self-consciousness.

sec.78: Doubt becomes despair because doubting the outside world means I doubt myself. That's ancient skepticism.

We're going to combine Cartesian radicalism-never to trust anything unless it counts for us as worthy, because that's what it is to try to vindicate a configuration of consciousness as Science-with the model in which inner and outer are mutually determining, so that once a consciousness loses its object- if I can no longer have my object,-then because I'm dependent upon that object, I lose myself. Doubt turns into despair.

If each doubt is a loss of self, then what we're going to look at are configurations of consciousness, a relationship between consciousness and object. The series of the configurations of consciousness is the education of consciousness to the standpoint of Science.

sec.28, sec.29
Who we are cannot be identified independently of the history we have passed through.
The phenomenology is going to activate all the sedimentations that are presupposed by our actual activities, what we do and say-for Hegel: Subject. By showing there's a history here we're showing the Substance. Everything in my head has been not just in my head, but is formed by collective social practice, and we're retrieving those strata of practice. We're trying to tap our own collective unconscious. It's not something external, but a kind of collective psychoanalysis. But Hegel doesn't pretend, for example, that Oedipus maps on to all times and places, though "unconscious" does.

E.g. because of Luther, even Catholics are now Protestants. We're all protestants. It doesn't matter whether you're a Jewish Protestant since each of us has a free relationship to our God. We make Protestant choices, and this is due to Luther. We don't go through a Lutheresque moment on the way to religious tolerance; rather, it's the case that that factic history is sedimented in our actual practices. E.g. you can't return to tradition out of freewill without there being a paradox. Luther is quite unlike Descartes.

If entire history is not sedimented in the word, then something has been abstracted.

The narrative of the present can only be 'objective' by abstracting some sedimentation and taking that for an object, but the Subject's abstracted part of itself.

I.e. Luther is only necessary to the hegemonic symbolic (temporality is missing from the mono-symbolic). Other symbolics may have different sedimentations, i.e., negated some other part of itself and took that for its object. Else it's a Universal Law.

We hope to produce a Cartesian skepticism even more radical than Descartes that ends up in a position of knowing. It's not merely a return to ancient skepticism; it's an invocation of ancient skepticism to produce a more modern skepticism. A unique synthesis of the ancient and modern.

sec.79 Determinate negation
A series, a history of the development of consciousness, and the necessary progression/interconnection of the forms of unreal consciousness will itself bring to pass the completion of the series. He's not merely handing us a dogmatism; rather, he's telling us that that's the only way were ever going to get there.

This is the first time that history is taken as really formative of consciousness, since unreal forms of consciousness are determinate.

For Hegel, passion and reason are of the same order, hence his deep anti-Kantianism.

For Hegel, there's no ultimate split between Eros and Logos. We're passionate creatures.

sec.80
The goal is for Subject and Object to respond (not correspond) to one another, since it's now a story between subjects. But progress is unhalting because consciousness "can't get no satisfaction," i.e., there's no correspondence.

You're vested in your world because you think it will provide satisfaction. When you lose your symbolic order, you lose your world. But that order isn't a fact, it's a horizon. Consciousness, then, is already outside its own factical relationship to the world. That's what drives things on to the next phase.
The investment here is in the normativity of the practice as constituting the being of that world. If that gets lost by the very attempt to found it, it's a world that collapses, not just a fact that happens. That's the sense in which you're already beyond your world. You are the very horizon and the connection of world and object. Consciousness is already beyond since it sets up the relationship. That whole is the condition of possibility of your being satisfied.

How can we generate a procedure? So now that we know what kind of story it is, how can we tell the story in a way that's rhetorically answerable to its audience?
Who am I is given by the horizon I project. What's beyond the horizon is not 'the' beyond but 'a' beyond. For Hegel, consciousness is transcendence because it is the creation-projection of the horizon.

The horizon becomes visible in the time of crisis. Before that, one was already transcendent, but one just didn't know it.

sec.81
How are we going to carry out this project of surveying the various forms of consciousness? The philosopher would say that we need a standard. But if we had one, we'd need no procedure.

sec.82
We can overcome the contradiction by noting-this is the turning point of the whole introduction-the distinction between truth and what is the essence, what is the standard, and knowledge or awareness of that is itself constitutive of the structure of consciousness.

Consciousness is an intentional relation to an object. And an intentional relation to an object means that something appears as an object if and only if consciousness brings itself into relationship with the object, that is, it sets itself into a meaningful relationship. Hence the knowing of an object and consciousness is itself the work of consciousness.

This relationship of consciousness to object is what Kant calls apperception. Kant: nothing can be an object for consciousness unless I think it is an object of my consciousness. The I think must accompany all our representations, or they would be nothing to me. Every relationship to an object is an intentional relation, that is a perceiving, a dreaming, a wondering, a questioning, a thinking about, desiring, or a doubting, etc. The object must be for me.

Furthermore, every intentionality of consciousness has a particular form. Every consciousness stipulates (horizon) its concept of an object, what it means to have a world.

E.g. for Aquinas it's ens creatum. For another, everything reflects God (faith).

What phenomenology is is simply watching each form of consciousness test itself.
Essence is what consciousness stipulates as its concept of an object, the in-itself. Each form of consciousness stipulates its own criterion of truth, and stipulates what it is to know that.

Its concept of an object is its interpretation for each concrete object. Hegel's methodology: Does the actual experience of the object match the claim of what the object is?

But it's only the transcendental idealists for whom it is the case that the relationship between consciousness and object is an internal relationship set by particular categorial articulations of the world. That's what transcendental idealism is. Transcendental because you have these forms that give the subject-object relationship. Ergo this idea of consciousness measuring itself as a methodology is not presuppositionless, is not neutral, is not absolutely objective. On the contrary, it's only acceptable to 'we' we transcendental idealists. Hegel presupposes the Copernican turn, makes it into a method. The Copernican turn: asking if the object must match the demands of consciousness. That principle is Hegel's methodology.

self: world::form of knowing: Concept of Object

sense-certainty: particulars (sense certainty's truth or essence; 'This') (not really given a chance in the Phenomenology.)

perception: things with properties

understanding: forces and laws

He says: either we have to stipulate a criterion; no we don't have to stipulate a criterion because consciousness is this measurement. That makes it presuppositionless for the idealists.

Methodologically it seems to me either some form of idealism is shown to be true, or skepticism is shown to be true, but at no point is realism shown to be true in its own terms. A strong version of representational realism isn't given a chance here.

If we are idealists, we'll be seduced by the move from sec.81 to sec.82 into thinking that what we've got is a neutral methodology. Because for us idealists, idealism is natural and objective. The Hegelians have simply fallen for the seduction since that movement is precisely what's natural for transcendental idealists.

The new object emerges when there's a failure of correspondence between the form of knowing and the object.

The object of immediate sense certainty changes with context. The change of context cannot be accounted for in sense-certainty. E.g. "This is noon." The notion of 'This' in its immediacy picks out nothing. The belief that I had that I knew the object immediately was merely a belief. At first I thought it was the truth. Desire emerges as soon as I lose my first certainty. As soon as I lose my first certainty (Freud: the moment I can distinguish myself from the Mother), I want to recapture it. If it's a loss of certainty, which is after all a way of giving my self the world-the certainty is the emphatic moment of the giving-it's the way I'm staked in that giving. The certainty is the way in which I'm staked in a giving of the world.

sec.86
Repeats determinate negation at the level of phenomenological movement.

Experience is the conversion of consciousness. It is always the experience of a loss of a form of engaging with the world and the coming on of a new one. That's what it means to have an experience: to be turned around or converted, transformed or transfigured.
Consciousness doesn't see that the transition from the first object to the second is a determinate negation, and therefore the form of a generation in which it's re-jiggling the world, it's being educated. It just thinks it's gotten out of a paradigm and discovered a new one.

sec.87
What we bring to the story: the way in which the various forms of consciousness are internally connected with one another, one generating the next as an experience of education. It's making those connections that makes phenomenology itself a form of science.

sec.88
The Phenomenology is the science of consciousness's experience. It's not knowledge of an absolute object, but a certain way in which knowledge is no longer conditioned, no longer caught in the trammels of the experience of consciousness.
The past is not a sequence of mere mistakes, but are my substance. That's why the relation to the past should be not just memory, but mourning.

Hegel was fighting against the instrumentalization of reason that was resulting from the natural sciences-humanities split.